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Abstract 
The main goal of this study is to quantify the impact of teacher interac-
tions on student achievement to facilitate recommending policy strategies that 
minimize high school dropout rates. This study derives a system of differential 
equations that examine the effects that teachers have on minority high school 
students' learning experience in California and Arizona. The first mathematical 
model focuses on the impact that teacher dynamics have on a schools' faculty 
composition. Teacher dynamics are coupled with a second system that models 
student responses to teacher preparation and experience in order to investigate 
the effects of these interactions on high school dropout and completion rates. 
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Background 
Almost all people share a common socializing experience: sitting in a 
classroom with a teacher. The effects of the encounter are far reaching since 
education shapes a person's future in countless ways. Yet, too many high school 
students drop out, forgoing the benefits a formal education affords. For Latinos, 
who are more likely to drop out than any other groups (NCES 1994), it is an 
especially serious concern. Searching for explanations, studies tend to name 
students' backgrounds as the primary cause. However, research is beginning 
to show that there exists a stronger relationship between teacher qualifications 
and student achievement than between student characteristics and academic 
success {Darling-Hammond 1998). Not only does this agree with the intuitive 
account that better teachers make better students, but it also implies that 
there are perceptible differences in teachers' effectiveness. Consequently, while 
students are all taught by teachers, the caliber of instruction varies and this 
study attempts to quantify and analyze the impact teachers' qualifications have 
on high school dropout rates. 
One relatively well-defined indicator of teacher quality is teacher pre-
paredness. This term is difficult to quantify because of the somewhat subjective 
nature of assessing how qualified teachers are when they leave a certification 
program and enter into the school system. What skills determine how prepared 
a teacher is to educate students?. Anyone can take a class. The real test presents 
itself when these teachers are placed in classrooms with thirty students. Will 
they be able to perform? Will they be able to facilitate their students' learn-
ing (Kasprzyk 1999)? Studies show that much of what students learn depends 
on the expertise of the teacher (Darling-Hammond 1998), however researchers 
have been unable to fully quantify the effectiveness of teachers' interactions with 
students. 
The recent teacher shortage in California is resulting in the hiring of 
unqualified teachers. In California, 12.7% of teachers are unqualified, mean-
ing they have no certification or less than full certification (Darling-Hammond 
1998). This shortage is more prevalent in high minority areas where there is a 
higher concentration of unqualified teachers. As a result, these minority students 
have a low achievement rate due to poor quality teachers (Darling-Hammond 
1998). The problem is what should be done to alleviate this situation. Should 
students be packed into classrooms, 40-45 students at a time, with one qual-
ified teacher? Or should more unqualified teachers be hired and brought into 
the system to reduce the student-teacher ratio? Both questions bring about 
interesting dilemmas, but this study focuses on the effects that teachers' qual-
ifications have upon students. Based on the assumption that master teachers 
have a significantly positive effect on the students in their classrooms, there is 
a growing body of research that indicates how student achievement is highly 
associated with teacher education (Darling-Hammond 1998, Ingersoll 1999). It 
is important that the community know that teacher qualifications play a signifi-
cant role in student achievement. Then, community members will be able to ask 
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questions about the process of becoming a teacher, the prevalence of unqualified 
teachers in schools and, if need be, affect policy in order to change the situation. 
In light of the growing concern over the condition of education and 
the need for teachers, if there is an association between teacher qualifications 
and student achievement, then it should be explored. Thus, the purpose of this 
study is to investigate the effects of teacher dynamics on the high school student 
population and the dropout rate. 
Introduction 
By using two separate systems, one representing teacher population and 
another representing student population, it is possible to quantify how teachers 
affect high school completion and dropout rates. In the model derived below, 
the presence of master teachers in the system plays a vital role given that these 
teachers positively influence fully qualified teachers. It is the fully qualified and 
master teachers who have the most positive effect on the student population 
since their students are more likely to graduate from high school. 
In this study, three categories of teachers are defined according to the 
amount of education and certification they have (Darling-Hammond 2000). 
Teachers who have a bachelor's degree but do not have a teaching credential 
are defined as less than qualified teachers. These teachers are working under 
emergency credentials, waivers or temporary certification. It is assumed that 
this group of teachers is less effective in the classroom. This implies that the 
proportion of students they affect are more likely to drop out as opposed to 
graduating. Yet, there is a proportion of students who do graduate after inter-
acting with less than qualified teachers. Research indicates that these teachers 
have a higher attrition rates that can lead to instability in the school environ-
ment(NCES 1999). 
Fully qualified teachers are those who have a teaching credential and 
a bachelor's degree. In this study, it is assumed that the teacher population 
that is fully certified is more effective in the classroom than less than qualified 
teachers. Hence, the dropout rate of the proportion of students most affected 
by fully qualified teachers is lower than that of the students most affected by 
less than qualified teachers. 
Finally, teachers that complete the necessary credential programs, have 
long-term experience, and have a master's degree are defined as master teachers. 
This group of teachers is essential because it is assumed that they have the most 
positive effect on students in that a majority of students who come in contact 
with them will graduate. These teachers influence a proportion of fully qualified 
teachers to become master teachers. The result is that there will be more 
master teachers, in effect, decreasing the overall dropout rate and increasing 
the completion rate. 
The second system breaks down the student population into four dif-
ferent groups. Students that have yet to be influenced by teachers are defined 
as unaffected students. These students exit the system by other means such as 
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transferring to another school or taking the GED, General Educational Devel-
opment Test. The rates at which these students leave the system are relatively 
large compared to the exit rates of the other groups of students because of the 
way schools and states report completion and dropout data(NCES ). 
The other three groups of students are influenced by one of the three 
types of teachers defined above. One group is affected by less than qualified 
teachers. The last two groups are affected by fully qualified and master teachers, 
respectively. In the proceeding section, a diagram gives a better understanding 
of the two systems described above. Obviously, this is a highly simplified system 
of student-teacher interactions and its' value will depend on the conclusions that 
can be derived from its' analysis. For some types of questions, more detailed 
models may be required. However, in most cases, a complex and detailed model 
(while satisfactory at one level) is very likely to be too complicated to analyze. 
In this model of a student population, it is assumed that on average 
a student is affected by one type of teacher. While in a more complicated 
model, students would be affected by all types of teachers, analyzing that level of 
dynamics is too complicated for the resources available to this study. Therefore, 
this study looks at the average experience a student has rather than the separate 
interactions between a student and the different types of teachers. 
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Parameter Total number of students ... 
Parameter Description 
N in school population 
M Total teacher population 
s not affected by teachers 
T1 Less than qualified teachers h 
affected by less than qualified teachers 
T2 Fully qualified teachers 
12 affected by fully qualified teachers 
Ts Master Teachers 
Is affected by master teachers 
A Total teacher As 
entering the school system 
population turnover rate per unit time 
p Probability that less than qualified Parameter Rate at which ... 
teachers are hired f31 less than qualified teachers affect students 
1-p Probability that fully qualified f32 fully qualified teachers affect students 
are hired f3s master teachers affect students 
'Y Rate at which Jess than qualified P.s unaffected students graduate 
teachers become certified ds unaffected students drop out 
61 Rate at which less than qualified P.l students affected by less than qualified 
teachers leave the school teachers graduate 
62 Rate at which fully qualified dl students affected by less than qualified 
teachers leave school teachers drop out 
lis Rate at which master P.2 students affected by fully qualified 
teachers leave school teachers graduate 
{3* Rate at which master teachers d2 students affected by fully qualified 
influenced fully qualified teachers teachers drop out 
P.3 students affected by master teachers graduate 
ds students affected by master teachers drop out 
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2 Equations 
Two systems of differential equations are introduced. When coupled together, 
they model the effects teachers, with different levels of qualifications, have on 
high school dropout rates. The equations representing teachers are: 
dT1 pA- 1T1 - 81T1, (1) dt 
dTz /3*TzT3 (2) dt (1- p)A- M + 1T1- 8zTz, 
dT3 /3*TzT3 
- 83T3, (3) = dt M 
where M = T1 +Tz+T3 and A= 81T1 +8zT2+83T3, meaning A is not constant. 
In this system, it is assumed that the teacher population, M, remains constant. 
Here, A is a variable that represents newly hired teachers per unit of time and 
depends on the number of teachers leaving the school per unit time. 
The dynamics of less than qualified teachers are represented in Equation 
(1). The term pAis the rate less than qualified teachers enter the school system 
per unit time, 1T1 is the rate at which less than qualified teachers become fully 
qualified and 81T1 is the rate at which less than qualified teachers leave the 
system. 
The dynamics of fully qualified teachers are represented by Equation 
(2). The term (1 - p)A is the rate at which fully qualified teachers enter the 
system per unit time, f!"'i}Ta is the rate at which fully qualified teachers are 
influenced into becolning master teachers, 1T1 is the rate at which less than 
qualified teachers become fully qualified and 82T2 is the rate at which fully 
qualified teachers leave the system. 
The dynamics of well qualified teachers are represented by Equation 
(3). The term fl"rJTa is the rate at which fully qualified teachers become master 
teachers as a result of interactions between the two groups and 83T3 is the rate 
at which master teachers leave the system. In this model, it is assumed that 82 
is greater than 83, which means that the average career span of T3 teachers, J3 , 
is greater than that of Tz teachers, -J;. 
The equations representing students are: 
dS 
dt 
dft 
dt 
dlz 
dt 
dl3 
dt 
where N = S +It+ Iz + !3, o:s = /-LS +ds, and O:i = /-Li + di,i = 1,2,3. 
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(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
The dynamics of unaffected students is represented in Equation (4). 
The term As is the rate at which students enter the system, fhfl1 is the rate 
at which students are affected by less than qualified teachers, 1!2fl2 is the rate 
at which students are affected by fully qualified teachers and E!aft3 is the rate 
at which students are affected by master teachers. a:s S is the rate at which 
unaffected students leave the system, either by graduating or dropping out. 
The dynamics of students who have been affected by less than qualified 
teachers is represented in Equation (5). The term 1!1fl1 is the rate at which 
students are affected by less than qualified teachers and a:1ft is the rate at 
which students affected by less than qualified teachers leave the system, either 
by graduating or dropping out. 
The dynamics of the proportion of students who have been affected 
by fully qualified teachers is represented in Equation (6). The term 1!2J}2 is 
the rate at which students are affected by fully qualified teachers and a:2J2 is 
the rate at which students affected by fully qualified teachers leave the system, 
either by graduating or dropping out. 
The dynamics of the proportion of students who have been affected by 
master teachers is represented in Equation {7). The term t!aft3 is the rate at 
which students are affected by master teachers and a:3J3 is the rate at which 
students affected by master teachers leave the system, either by graduating or 
dropping out. 
In this model of a student population, it is assumed that on average 
a student is affected by one type of teacher. While in a more complicated 
model students would be affected by all types of teachers, analyzing that level of 
dynamics is too complicated for the resources available to this study. Therefore, 
this study looks at the average experience a student has rather than the separate 
interactions between a student and the different types of teachers. 
3 Finding Equilibrium Points for 
the Teacher System 
A question of interest is what is the long-term time evolution of the teacher 
system when t - oo. Hence, it is proceeded to find whether steady states are 
possible with no well qualified teachers in the system, T3 = 0, and with well 
qualified teachers in the system, T3 > 0. To find the equilibrium points for 
the teacher model, the system is reduced to two dimensions by substituting 
T3 = M - T1 - T2 into A: 
dT1 
dt 
dT2 
dt 
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Both equations are set equal to zero and added together. 
/3*T2(M- Tt - T2) 
6tTt + 82T2 + 6a(M- Tt - T2) - M - 6tTt - 82T2 = 0 
Algebraic manipulation and simplification steps yield the following equation: 
(9) 
Equation (9) implies there are two solutions. 
Case(!): M -T1 -T2 = 0. So, M = T1 +T2+Ta implies that T3 = 0. Therefore 
T3 = 0 corresponds to the Ta value for one equilibrium point. 
Case(2): 6a - 13J 2 = 0. Thus, T2 = 6~/f corresponds to the T2 value for 
the second equilibrium point. So T;* = 6~/f. 
Equilibrium: (Ti, T2, T;) 
The first equilibrium point from case (1) has T3 = 0. This equilibrium point 
represents the demographic steady state, in which there are no master teachers. 
Hence, 
The two equations are set equal to zero and solved for T1 using T2 = M - T1 . 
Hence, 
which implies, 
Therefore, 
T2 = M((l- p)Ot + -y) . 
( 1 - p )61 + p62 + 'Y 
Tj 
r; = 
r; 
(1- p)Ot + po2 + 'Y' 
M(qo1 + -y) 
(1 - p)Ot + po2 + 'Y' 
0. 
Since the parameters q, A, 6t, 62, Sa, and 'Y are all positive, the equilibrium 
point (Ti, T2, T3) always exists. 
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Equilibrium: (Tt*, T;*, T3*) 
The second equilibrium comes from case (2), where T2* = 6»1-f is substituted 
into Equation (8): 
Expanding and solving for T1 gives: 
T** p83M ( (3* + 82 - 83 ) 
1 = fF""" (1- p)81 + p83 + 1 . 
Finally, since T3* = M - Ti* - T-i*, then 
Therefore, (Ti*, T.;*, r;•) represents the second equilibrium point. AB with the 
first equilibrium point, (Ti*, T;*, T;*) must also have all positive values. In this 
case, T;* is automatically positive since 83 and (3* are always positive and 
rro•• _ 83 M 
.L2 - --g;-· 
ForTi* to exist, the only condition stems from the terms in the numerator. So, 
T** = p83M ( /3* + 82 - 83 ) > O. 
1 /3* (1 - p)81 + p83 + 1 
Ti* is positive as 82 is always greater than 83. 
For T3* to exist, the value cannot equal zero and must be positive. Thus, 
For simplicity, let q = (1- p) where q;::: 0 for all p. Then, 
(10) 
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So, Tj* exists when Equation (10) is true. Therefore, the condition for 
the existence of the equilibrium point where master teachers are present is the 
same condition as for the existence of Tj*. When Ro is less than 1, master 
teachers will leave the system before influencing other teachers to take their 
place. When Ro is greater than one, the number of master teachers will grow. 
In this study, the teacher interaction ratio, denoted by Ro, is essential because it 
defines a threshold of change when fully qualified teachers are influenced enough 
on the average to become master teachers. The teacher interaction ratio gives 
the threshold value for the teacher system. 
Then /!1 !\ is the probability that a T3 teacher will come into con-q!P2'Y 
tact with a T2 teacher, 6~ represents the average career span of a T3 teacher 
and {3"' is the probability that a T2 teacher will convert to a T3 teacher. Hence, 
Ro is the ratio of fully qualified teachers that are influenced to become master 
teachers. Hence, Ro < 1 implies that T3 --+ 0, while Ro > 1 implies that T3 will 
initially grow. 
4 Stability of Equilibria 
Since the teacher system has been reduced to a two dimensional system, then the 
stability depends on the values of the trace and the determinant of the Jacobian, 
matrix A, evaluated at the respective equilibrium points. The Jacobian is: 
In order for the equilibria to be locally asymptotically stable, the Routh-Hurwitz 
conditions trace(A) < 0 and det(A) > 0 must be satisfied. 
Stability of (Ti, T2, T3) 
For the first equilibrium point, the Jacobian, denoted as A*, is obtained by 
evaluating A at Ti and T2. 
Condition 1: 
After some manipulation, the condition for the trace to be negative is found to 
be: 
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Factoring and rearranging yields the condition: 
-83(1 - ~) - q81 - p82 - 'Y < 0. 
Note that ~ < 1 is sufficient to make the trace negative and the first condition 
is satisfied. 
Condition 2: 
det(A*) = -p8183 + p/3*81 + 8183- /3*81 + p8z83- /3*"1 + 83"/· 
By rearranging the expression for det(A*), it is clear when it is positive. For 
the determinant to be positive, the following condition must be met: 
/3* q81 + 'Y 1 
- < 83 q81 + p82 + 'Y . 
Thus, condition 2 is satisfied. Therefore, whenever ~ < 1, (Tt, T2, T3) 1s 
locally asymptotically stable. 
Stability for (T** T.** T.**) 1 ' 2 ' 3 
For the second equilibrium point, the Jacobian, denoted by A**, is obtained by 
evaluating A at Tt* and T;*. 
** ((p-I)81-P83-'Y p(8z-83) ) 
A = (1- p)81 + p83 + 'Y (I+ p)83- p82- /3* + p83-r+~~(f;)~po3 • 
Condition 1: 
(A**) (p )r: r: /3* r: 82 + /3*- 83 trace = - 1 u1 - "( + u1 - + pu3 8 ( ) 8 · 
'Y+ tl-p +P3 
After some manipulation, the condition for a negative trace is found to be: 
(p8183 + 81/3* + 'Y/3*)- (p81j3* + 6163 + "(83 + p8362) < 0. 
Factoring and rearranging yields the condition: 
/3* q61 + 'Y > 1 
63 q81 + p82 + 'Y • 
Condition 2: 
det(A**) = ((p- 1)81- p63- "f) ( 83- /3* + p83 (I !;);1°: ~\ 'Y). 
By simplifying, a condition is produced for det(A**). The determinant is positive 
if the following condition is met: 
(8163p+61J3* +'Y/3*)- (81f3*p+8163 +"183 +636zp) < 0. 
This can be rewritten as 
/3* q81 + 'Y > 1 
83 q81 + p62 + 'Y . 
Therefore, if~ > 1, (Tt*, T;*, T;*) exists and it is stable. 
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5 Teacher Equilibria in terms of Ro 
The teacher system is analyzed further by rewriting the equilibria in terms of 
Ro. This illustrates how the teacher system is affected by the teacher interaction 
ratio. Since Ta teachers are not present in the first equilibrium, then it is only 
necessary to examine T** as it varies with different values of Ro. For the second 
equilibrium, let 
K q61 + 'Y = q61 + p62 + 'Y' 
Q p(f3* + 02- oa) 
qo1 + poa + 'Y ' 
then 
Ti* 
KMQ 
= 
' Ro 
T.** KM 2 = Ro' 
T3* = M-
KM(1+Q) 
Ro 
AB Ro ---+ oo, Ti* and T;* diminish as T; approaches M. 
6 Analysis of Student System 
From the previous section the dynamics of the teacher system are known, i.e. 
Ro < 1, (T1o T2, Ta) ---+ (Ti, T2, T3) and Ro > 1, (T1o T2, Ta) ---+ (Ti*, T;*, T3*). 
According to the theory of limiting equations developed by Carlos Castilla-
Chavez and Horst Thime in 1995, the equilibrium values of the teacher system 
can be substituted in the student system. The resulting system is an ODE linear 
system. For this system, there exists only one equilibrium point that is always 
stable, and its value depends upon the proportion of teachers at any given 
time. (See appendix for derivation .of equilibrium point.) Coupled together, 
the equilibria from the teacher system generate corresponding equilibria for 
the student system. Therefore, to analyze the impact of teachers on the student 
system is enough to look at the impact of teacher equilibria on student equilibria. 
Whereas, the parameter values for the teacher system are all available 
so that determining the teacher distribution is only a matter of computing the 
equilibrium values for the given parameters, not all of the parameters for the 
student system are known or can be estimated realistically. In particular, the 
rates at which different teachers affect students, {31, /32, and f3a, are beyond the 
scope of the data that is available. In other words, there is no quantitative 
measures of the role of various types of teachers on students' achievement and 
retention. Consequently, the best information the model provides is in the form 
of the relative impact of master teachers compared to other teachers on student 
dropout and graduation rates. 
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7 Results 
This model illustrates how high school students are affected by teachers and, 
specifically, by the distribution of less than qualified, fully qualified and master 
teachers. The student system is analyzed considering the two master teacher 
population distributions. However, data for the rates at which different teachers 
affect students is not available. Even though it is possible to estimate the 
dropout rate for a given school, it is not possible, at present, to quantify how 
teachers impact students in terms of {3~, /32, and /33. One strategy available is to 
increase the proportion of master teachers in the system. This is based on the 
assumption that master teachers have a significantly different and positive effect 
on the students in those classrooms. There is a growing body of research that 
indicates how student achievement is associated so highly with teacher education 
that the effects of teacher qualifications can no longer be ignored (Darling-
. Hammond 1998, Ingersoll). Thus, the best information the model provides 
at this point is how the parameters affect the proportion of master teachers 
in a school. Therefore, it is worthwhile to further analyze the nature of the 
parameters in the teacher model. 
To determine how parameters affect T3*, the partial derivative can be 
used since it represents how the equilibrium point responds to change. {3* and 
p are of most interest because hiring practices can be influenced through poli-
cies, and master teachers' abilities to mentor other teachers can be fostered by 
administrative decisions and community advocacy. The partial derivatives with 
respect to (3* and p are 
Using data from national and state agencies, the parameters values are 
estimated to be 61 = 0.84, 62 = 0.04, 6a = 0.13, 'Y = 0.33, p = 0.07 and 
{3* = 0.15 for an average California high school. This gives the value ll{) = 1.15. 
Similarly, the parameter values for an average Arizona high school are found to 
be 61 = 0.5, 62 = 0.05, 6a = 0.06, 'Y = 0.5, p = .4 and (3* = 0.10. This gives 
the value ll{) = 1.62. These sets of parameters are substituted into the partial 
derivatives of T3* with respect to changes of {3* and p. For Arizona, the rate 
of change for {3* is 265, while the rate of change for pis -79.53. For California, 
the rate of change for (3* is 514.52, while the rate of change for p is -32.32. For 
California, (3* is large and positive, which means a small increase in (3* results 
in a relatively large increase in the proportion of master teachers. Likewise, 
for p, a small change causes a decrease in the proportion of master teachers. 
Similarly, Arizona has large positive values for {3* and negative values for p. By 
plotting the proportion of master teachers versus the estimated parameters for 
Arizona and California, these calculations can be verified. 
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It is assumed that master teachers have the best effect on students, 
because of their qualifications and experience. Hence, the goal is to find out 
how to increase the proportion of master teachers in a given school. Since this 
study focuses on California and Arizona, two questions are considered. What 
parameters change the proportion of master teachers the greatest and what 
parameter values make master teachers ineffective at recruiting new master 
teachers? 
0 
0.8 0 
0 
0 
0.6 0 
0 
0 
Avg CA High School Ro 1.15 
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~ = 0.15 
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Paraaeters 
Using the same parameters values for an average California high school, 
this graph shows how sensitive T!;" is to changes in the parameter values. 
When the value of {3* is nearer the value of 63, increasing {3* for some small 
amount causes almost exponential growth in the proportion of master teachers. 
Although the graph of T3* vs 63 has a negative slope, the graph of T3* vs 63 
has a steeper negative slope. This implies that if master teachers retire slightly 
earlier than the given 63, the effect on the proportion of master teachers would 
be substantially large and negative. 
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Arizona shows similar conditions. 
Avg AZ High School: Ro = 1.62 
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Paraaeters 
For an average Arizona high school, ba, and (3* are sensitive parameters, 
but in this case c2 has a large negative slope. This means that the master 
teacher population in an average Arizona high school is more likely than an 
average California school to feel the impact of fully qualified teachers retiring 
early. Otherwise, neither California nor Arizona master teacher population 
demonstrate a strong sensitivity to fluctuations with respect to C1 and 1 in the 
less than qualified teacher population. 
8 Discussion 
The situation for master teachers to be successful in average California and 
Arizona high schools is in jeopardy because of many social and economic rea-
sons. For students and teachers in schools with high minority populations, the 
conditions are even more unstable. Minority and low-income students are more 
likely to attend schools with a high proportion of less than qualified teachers 
(Darling-Hammond 1998). Furthermore, Latino students have suffered dispro-
portionate dropout rates, and in areas such as Los Angeles County, they have 
been instructed by as much as 60% of all the state's less than qualified teach-
ers(CSU 1996) . In Arizona, Latinos are even more likely to drop out, especially 
in urban areas (lngersoll1999). These patterns translate into parameter values 
that differ from the average values for the states. 
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The parameter values are estimated to be 61 = 0. 7 4, 62 = 0.05, 63 = 0.1, 
'Y = 0.33, p = 0.5, and {3* = 0.15 for an average California high school with 
minorities > 50%. This gives a value of Ro = 1.45. The parameter values are 
estimated to be 61 = 0.75, 62 = 0.04, 63 = 0.11, 'Y = 0.33, p = .4 and {3'" = 0.10 
for an average Arizona high school with minorities > 50%. This gives a value 
of Ro = 1.32. 
For California minority students, similar to the previous graphs, {3'" is 
a significant parameter in that slight increases can change the proportion of 
master teachers for the better. However, because of social conditions embodied 
by the high number of newly hired less than qualified teachers, ~ is a crucial 
parameter. As the fully certified teachers leave the system, they are replaced 
by high numbers of less than qualified teachers. Hence, {3* may be less than 
0.10 because a lower value could be more realistic. "Student characteristics 
such as poverty, ... and minority status are negatively correlated with students 
outcomes... These student characteristics are [similarly] correlated with the 
qualifications of teachers; that is the less socially advantaged the students, ... 
the more likely [teachers] are to have entered teaching without certification" 
(Darling-Hammond 2000). 
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Arizona minority students face similar outcomes. 
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In Arizona, 82 has an even steeper slope. Minority students experience 
very similar conditions to those in California. The results show that student's 
achievement does not necessarily depend on their demographics. In fact, this 
suggests that there is a link between teachers' and her/his qualifications and 
the success or failure of students. While there is clearly a combination of social 
factors implicit in this discussion, what should not be taken for granted is that 
teachers do not affect students or that students are the only cause for their 
failures. It is a complex set of issues and circumstances, and as these graphs 
illustrate, some factors are more related than others. Most importantly, some 
factors can be targeted because of the stronger effects on the teacher populations 
and the subsequent student experiences. 
Conclusion 
The initial purpose of this study was to find conditions that would 
reduce existing school dropout rates. After researching available resources, it 
was difficult to determine the rates at which less than qualified, fully qualified 
and master teachers affect students. The available data provides only enough 
information to analyze the conditions that will enable master teachers to thrive. 
The results show how necessary it is to have enough qualified teachers in the 
classroom. Increasing the effectiveness of master teachers in various school 
settings demonstrates the need of supporting a critical mass of master teachers 
in each school. 
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This study finds that less than fully qualified teachers tend to leave 
average CA and AZ minority high schools before becoming master teachers more 
than for average CA and AZ high schools. This reduces the pool of teachers for 
master teachers to work with and recruit from which impacts their effectiveness 
as master teachers. It also causes master teachers to invest in developing fully 
qualified teachers who then leave without contributing at the minority school. 
FUrthermore, this study concludes that lowering student teacher ratios does 
not increase the effectiveness of master teachers if it is based on the hiring of 
less than fully qualified teachers. Less than fully qualified teachers tend to leave 
minority schools at a greater rate than the time it takes for them to become fully 
qualified and then reach the level of experience and education to be an effective 
master teacher themselves. Finally, this research indicates that the best way 
to increase the proportion of master teachers is by providing opportunities for 
them to develop fully qualified teachers. 
While student demographics play a role in student achievement, this 
study shows that teacher qualifications should not be ignored. Beyond the 
need to hire fully qualified teachers and support master teachers, policy mak-
ers and educational advocates need to screen and monitor teacher recruitment 
programs. Some programs offer incentives and make exceptions for individuals 
who are less than qualified to be teachers in order to find enough teachers for 
minority schools. If there are no guarantees that the teachers will stay and 
become effective as master teachers, then minority communities find themselves 
paying extra for less than qualified teachers and then watching their invest-
ments leave to other schools when they need the experienced teachers the most. 
Therefore, education advocates and minority community members should re-
quest detailed teacher preparedness reports as part of school reform efforts in 
order to take into account how teacher qualifications effect student achievement. 
Future Studies 
Throughout this project, it has become clear how complicated the 
present situation is in the high school educational system. Some factors in-
clude out-of-field teaching where a teacher has a degree in one subject area but 
actually teaches in another area. For example, a teacher with a degree in math-
ematics is teaching science. There is also evidence that cultural affinity plays a 
role in student achievement. One possible aspect to analyze would be the effects 
that Latino master teachers have on Latino students. It is possible to study the 
effects of different types of teachers on students, with respect to gender and race 
and the effects of less than qualified teachers on master teacher attrition rates 
and vice versa. Finally, it would be beneficial to study the teacher recruitment 
programs which are already in place across the nation. Above all, it is most 
important to ensure that the community is aware of what is happening in to-
day's educational system so as to create a beneficial learning environment for 
students and teachers alike. 
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Appendix 
A Derivation of stable equilibrium point 
for student system 
Recall the equations from the student model, i.e, equations (4)-(7). Using these 
equations, the system is solved in terms of S, h, 12 , 13 . The results show only 
the following solution: 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
13 = Af33T3 . 
a3 (f3I T1 + f32T2 + f33T3 + as M) (14) 
The Jacobian for the student system of equations is 
( -( P;i• + "'i' + ';i' + "•) 0 0 
0 ) 1T1 -al 0  As= /3*2 0 -a2 0 . p:h 0 0 -a3 M 
Condition 1: 
( f3ITI f32T2 f33T3 ) trace(As) - -u + -u + M +as +at +a2+a3 
( f3ITI fi2T2 f33T3 ) => - -u+M+M+as+a1+a2+a3 <0. 
Thus, the trace is always negative and condition (1) is satisfied. 
Condition 2: 
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Thus, the determinant is always positive and condition (2) is satisfied. 
Since the determinant is positive and the trace is negative for any point, T* 
and T*'" will be stable precisely one at a time. Therefore, a stable equilibrium 
point for the teacher system generates a corresponding stable equilibrium point 
for the student system. 
B Writing equilibria in terms of Ro 
for the student model 
Using T*, let 
Then, 
S* = {3* A(q6t + 'Y) 
z* 
1i RoPf3t626aA = 
cttZ* 
12 = Rof326aA( q61 + "f) 
a2z* 
13 = 0 
Using T**, let 
z** = f3t ( ~) + 132 ( ~) + f3a ( 1 - ~ - ~) . 
Then, 
S** A = 
z** 
1i* f3tAKQ = Roatz** 
12* f32AK 
Roa2z** 
13* = /3aA ( 1 _ _!£_KQ) 
aaz** Ro Ro · 
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(15} 
(16} 
C Partial Derivatives of Teacher Equilibrium 
To check how sensitive the equilibrium point, r;•, is to small changes in the pa-
rameters, the point is differentiated with respect to each parameter in Ro. This 
will give an expression in terms of the parameters that can be solved. Note 
that the partial derivative of r;• with respect to M is not computed because 
it is constant. Below are the computed partial derivatives with respect to the 
parameters found in Ro: 
D MATLAB code 
The following MATLAB code is used to generate the graphs used in this study. 
%T3** = Z 
Y.X = P 
%Y = Beta* 
%This is the code we use to plot T3/H vs Beta* and p 
%Z = 1- (delta3./X)- (Y•delta3./X).•(delta2+X-delta3)./(delta1-
%Y•delta1+gamma+Y•delta3); 
%axis([O 1 0 1 0 1]) 
figure 
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•. 
subplot(2,2,1) 
hold on 
delta1=0.5; 
delta2=0.04; 
delta3=0.06; 
gamma=0.75; 
p=0.15; 
beta=0.15; 
t = .01: .01:1; 
y(1)=beta; 
y = 1-(delta3./t)-(p*delta3./t).*(delta2+t-delta3)./(delta1-
p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, '*') 
y(2)=p; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(t*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-t*delta1+gamma+t*delta3); 
plot(t,y, '-') 
y(3)=gamma; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-p*delta1+t+p*delta3); 
plot(t ,y, '+') 
y(4)=delta1; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(t-p*t+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, ' . ' ) 
y(5)=delta2; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(t+beta-delta3)./(delta1-
p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, ' : ') 
y(6)=delta3; 
y = 1-(t./beta)-(p*t./beta).*(delta2+beta-t)./(delta1-p*delta1+ 
gamma+p*t); 
plot(t,y, 'o') 
axis ( [0 1 0 1]) 
title('Avg National High School: Ro > 1') 
xlabel('Parameters: \beta-* = 0.15, p = 0.15, \gamma= 0.75, 
\delta!= 0.5, \delta2 = 0.04, \delta3 = 0.06'); 
ylabel('T3** /M'); 
%legend('\beta-*','p','\gamma','\delta1','\delta2','\delta3'); 
zoom 
hold off 
subplot(2,2,2) 
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hold on 
delta1=0.84; 
delta2=0.04; 
del ta3=0. 13; 
gamma=0.33; 
p=0.07; 
beta=0.15; 
t = .01: .01:1; 
y(1)=beta; 
y = 1-(delta3./t)-(p*delta3./t).*(delta2+t-delta3)./(delta1-
p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, • * • ) 
y(2)=p; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(t*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-t*delta1+gamma+t*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, •- • ) 
y(3)=gamma; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-p*delta1+t+p*delta3); 
plot (t ,y, '+') 
y(4)=delta1; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(t-p*t+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, • . • ) 
y(5)=delta2; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(t+beta-delta3)./(delta1-
p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, • : • ) 
y(6)=delta3; 
y = 1-(t./beta)-(p*t./beta).*(delta2+beta-t)./(delta1-p*delta1+ 
gamma+p*t); 
plot(t, y, •o•) 
axis ( [0 1 0 1] ) 
title('Avg CA High School: Ro > 1') 
xlabel('Parameters: \beta-*= 0.15, p = 0.07, \gamma= 0.33, 
\delta1 = 0.84, \delta2 = 0.04, \delta3 = 0.13'); 
ylabel('T3** /M'); 
Y.legend('\beta-*' ,'p','\gamma','\delta1','\delta2','\delta3');zoom 
hold off 
subplot(2,2,3) 
hold on 
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delta1=0. 74; 
delta2=0.05; 
delta3=0.1; %10 years 
gamma=0.33; 
p=0.5; 
beta=0.15; 
t = .01:.01: 1; 
y(1)=beta; 
y = 1-(delta3./t)-(p*delta3./t).*(delta2+t-delta3)./(delta1-
p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t , y, • * ' ) 
y(2)=p; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(t*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-t*delta1+gamma+t*delta3); 
plot(t ,y, '-') 
y(3)=gamma; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-p*delta1+t+p*delta3); 
plot(t ,y, '+') 
y(4)=delta1; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(t-p*t+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot(t,y, '. ') 
y(5)=delta2; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(t+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot(t,y, ': ') 
y(6)=delta3; 
y = 1-(t./beta)-(p*t./beta).*(delta2+beta-t)./(delta1-p*delta1+ 
gamma+p*t); 
plot(t,y, 'o') 
axis ( [0 1 0 1]) 
title('CA High School with Minorities > 50%: Ro > 1') 
xlabel('Parameters: \betaA* = 0.15, p = 0.5, \gamma= 0.33, 
\delta1 = 0.74, \delta2 = 0.05, \delta3 = 0.1'); 
ylabel('T3** /M'); 
%legend('\betaA*','p','\gamma','\delta1','\delta2','\delta3'); 
zoom 
hold off 
subplot(2,2,4) 
hold on 
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delta1=0.74; 
delta2=0.05; 
delta3=0.1; %10 years 
gamma=0.33; 
p=0.5; 
beta=0.09; 
t = .01:.01:1; 
y(1)=beta; 
y = 1-(delta3./t)-(p*delta3./t).*(delta2+t-delta3)./(delta1-
p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot(t,y, '*') 
y(2)=p; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(t*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-t*delta1+gamma+t*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, '-' ) 
y(3)=gamma; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-p*delta1+t+p*delta3); 
plot ( t , y, '+') 
y(4)=delta1; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(t-p*t+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, ' . ' ) 
y(5)=delta2; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(t+beta-delta3)./(delta1-
p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot(t,y,': ') 
y(6)=delta3; 
y = 1-(t./beta)-(p*t./beta).*(delta2+beta-t)./(delta1-p*delta1+ 
gamma+p*t); 
plot(t,y, 'o') 
axis ( [0 1 0 1]) 
title('CA High School with Minorities > 50%: Ro < 1') 
xlabel('Parameters: \beta-* = 0.09, p = 0.5, \gamma= 0.33, 
\delta1 = 0.74, \delta2 = 0.05, \delta3 = 0.1'); 
ylabel('T3** /M'); 
legend('\beta-*','p','\gamma','\delta1' ,'\delta2','\delta3'); 
zoom 
hold off 
figure 
subplot(2,2,1) 
hold on 
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delta1=0.5; · 
delta2=0.04; 
delta3=0.06; 
gamma=0.75; 
p=0.15; 
beta=0.15; 
t = .01: .01:1; 
y(1)=beta; 
y = 1-(delta3./t)-(p•delta3./t).*(delta2+t-delta3)./(delta1-
p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t , y, ' * • ) 
y(2)=p; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(t•delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-t•delta1+gamma+t•delta3); 
plot(t ,y, '-') 
y(3)=gamma; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).•(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-p*delta1+t+p•delta3); 
plot(t ,y, '+') 
y(4)=delta1; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p•delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(t-p*t+gamma+p•delta3); 
plot ( t, y, ' . ' ) 
y(5)=delta2; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).•(t+beta-delta3)./(delta1-
p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, ' : ') 
y(6)=delta3; 
y = 1-(t./beta)-(p*t./beta).•(delta2+beta-t)./(delta1-p*delta1+ 
gamma+p•t); 
plot(t, y, 'o') 
axis ( [0 1 0 1]) 
title('Avg National High School: Ro > 1') 
xlabel('Parameters: \beta-* = 0.15, p = 0.15, \gamma= 0.75, 
\delta1 = 0.5, \delta2 = 0.04, \delta3 = 0.06'); 
ylabel('T3** /M'); 
%legend('\beta-•','p','\gamma','\delta1','\delta2','\delta3'); 
zoom 
hold off 
subplot(2,2,2) 
hold on 
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delta1=0.5; 
delta2=0.05; 
delta3=0.06; 
gamma=0.5; 
p=0.4; 
beta=0.10; 
t = .01: .01:1; 
y(l)=beta; 
y = 1-(delta3./t)-(p*delta3./t).•(delta2+t-delta3)./(delta1-
p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t , y, '*' ) 
y(2)=p; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(t•delta3./beta).•(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-t•delta1+gamma+t•delta3); 
plot(t ,y, '-') 
y(3)=gamma; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).•(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-p•delta1+t+p•delta3); 
plot(t,y, '+') 
y(4)=delta1; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).•(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(t-p•t+gamma+p•delta3); 
plot ( t, y, ' . ') 
y(5)=delta2; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).•(t+beta-delta3)./(delta1-
p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot(t,y, ': ') 
y(6)=delta3; 
y = 1-(t./beta)-(p•t./beta).•(delta2+beta-t)./(delta1-p*delta1+ 
gamma+p•t) ; 
plot ( t, y, 'o') 
axis([O 1 0 1]) 
title('Avg AZ High School: Ro > 1') 
xlabel('Parameters: \beta-* = 0.10, p = 0.4, \gamma= 0.5, 
\delta!= 0.5, \delta2 = 0.05, \delta3 = 0.06'); 
ylabel('T3** /M'); 
%legend('\beta-*','p' ,'\gamma' ,'\delta1','\delta2' ,'\delta3');zoom 
hold off 
subplot(2,2,3) 
hold on 
delta1=0.75; 
delta2=0.04; 
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delta3=0.11; 
gamma=0.33; 
p=0.6; 
beta=0.15; 
t = .01: .01:1; 
y(l)=beta; 
y = 1-(delta3./t)-(p*delta3./t).*(delta2+t-delta3)./(delta1-
p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t , y, '*') 
y(2)=p; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(t*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-t*delta1+gamma+t*delta3); 
plot(t,y, '-') 
y(3)=gamma; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-p*delta1+t+p*delta3); 
plot(t ,y, '+') 
y(4)=delta1; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(t-p*t+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot(t,y,'. ') 
y(5)=delta2; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(t+beta-delta3)./(delta1-
p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, ' : ') 
y(6) =delta3; 
y = 1-(t./beta)-(p*t./beta).*(delta2+beta-t)./(delta1-p*delta1+ 
gamma+p*t); 
plot(t ,y, 'o') 
axis([O 1 0 1]) 
title('AZ High School with Minorities > 50% : Ro > 1') 
xlabel('Parameters: \beta-* = 0.15, p = 0.6, \gamma= 0.33, 
\delta!= 0.75, \delta2 = 0.04, \delta3 = 0.11'); 
ylabel('T3** /M'); 
legend('\beta-*','p','\gamma','\delta1','\delta2','\delta3');zoom 
hold off 
subplot(2,2,4) 
hold on 
delta1=0.75; 
delta2=0.04; 
del ta3=0. 11; 
gamma=0.33; 
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p=0.6; 
beta=0.09; 
t = .01:.01:1; 
y(1)=beta; 
y = 1-(delta3./t)-(p*delta3./t).*(delta2+t-delta3)./ 
(delta1-p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, '*') 
y(2)=p; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(t*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-t*delta1+gamma+t*delta3); 
plot(t,y, '-') 
y(3)=gamma; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-p*delta1+t+p*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, '+' ) 
y(4)=delta1; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(delta2+beta-delta3)./ 
(t-p*t+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t , y, ' . ' ) 
y(5)=delta2; 
y = 1-(delta3/beta)-(p*delta3./beta).*(t+beta-delta3)./ 
(delta1-p*delta1+gamma+p*delta3); 
plot ( t, y, ' : ' ) 
y(6)=delta3; 
y = 1-(t./beta)-(p*t./beta).*(delta2+beta-t)./ 
(delta1-p*delta1+gamma+p*t); 
plot ( t, y, 'o' ) 
axis ( [0 1 0 1] ) 
title('AZ High School with Minorities > 50%: Ro < 1') 
xlabel('Parameters: \betaA* = 0.09, p = 0.6, \gamma= 0.33, 
\delta1 = .75, \delta2 = 0.04, \delta3 = 0.11'); 
ylabel('T3** /M'); 
Y.legend('\beta-*' ,'p','\gamma','\delta1','\delta2','\delta3');zoom 
hold off 
Y. 
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